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**WEER** vol. VIII/2018

**TRUMP, AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE**

# Warsaw East European Review

Volume VIII/2018 | REVISED

editorial discussion

# Trump, America and Eastern Europe

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Kowal | Malicki | Micgiel | Pełczyńska-Nałęcz | Riabchuk

**Warsaw**  
**East**  
**European**  
**Review**

Volume VIII/2018 | REVISED

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## Foreword

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What challenges does East Central Europe face today? Now fully sovereign, the countries of the region seek new partnerships globally, address new and old problems locally, and engage their neighbours to tackle issues of common interest.

This, the eighth edition of the Warsaw East European Review (WEER) is the consequence of the 2017 Warsaw East European Conference, entitled "East Central Europe vis-a-vis Global Challenges". Some ninety scholars met and presented their views over four days of meetings in Warsaw in July 2017. The editors invited those with particularly timely remarks to submit their essays for publication, and have included a discussion of the WEER editorial board.

The volume begins with a discussion of a group of experts concerning "President Trump's America and Eastern Europe" and remarks during the conference by two former U.S. ambassadors touching on the same topic. Additional texts were delivered during panels examining: EU policy toward the Black Sea region; security, borders and regional conflict in East Central Europe; hybrid aggression and cyber security; regional security; Germany's new partners: bilateral security relations of Europe's reluctant leader; Central and Eastern Europe on the new Silk Road; the Caucasus; transformation in East and Central Europe; Russia and its neighbours; restoring Ukraine; European Union policy toward East Central Europe; challenges for the security policy of the Eastern European countries; East Central European foreign policy towards Russia; propaganda; what's new in Polish-Ukrainian relations; Israel/Middle East and Central and Eastern Europe/Poland; transformation of political systems and historical memory; Belarus between East and West; natural resources as a policy tool; and religion, identity and politics. Partner institutions cosponsored some of the sessions including: the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland; George C. Marshall Center; the embassy of the Republic of Georgia; the Center for Asian Affairs of the University of Łódź; the Israel Council on Foreign Relations; the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum; and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organizers wish to express their gratitude to them and to the scholars who participated in the conference and in this volume.

Paweł Kowal, John S. Micgiel

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# Trump, America and Eastern Europe



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# Trump, America and Eastern Europe

## An editorial discussion of the Warsaw East European Review

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*with: Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Jan Malicki, John S. Micgjel  
and Mykola Riabchuk*

*led by: Paweł Kowal*

**Paweł Kowal**<sup>1</sup>: Thank you for coming to our annual meeting. A certain paradox is that when President Trump became president of the United States, today's undersecretary of state for our part of Europe participated in the formulation of a letter on behalf of people from Central Europe, the point of which was to express concern that President Trump will change the current policy in our region, in other words, most experts expected the worst. The letter appeared more or less a year ago in *The New York Times*, and today Wess Mitchell, our colleague, is an important person in the administration. I think that this is a benchmark of how things with Donald Trump in matters of Central and Eastern Europe have gone so far, certainly differently than pessimists expected – we will get to this point in the discussion. Meanwhile, I would like to refer to the roots. I want us to think about how it happened that America has been so strongly present in our part of the world since the 1980s and 1990s. This was decided by politics, by events in the world in the 1970s, but sometimes there is also the role of the individual. I think that you cannot talk about it seriously in Poland without being reminded of one person, and that is Zbigniew Brzezinski, and I would

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# US Foreign Policy in East and Central Europe



WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017 OPENING SPEECH

AMB. MATTHEW BRYZA

***Shaking the Foundation:  
the Trump Administration and NATO's East***

This is a very powerful place for me to be, here at the University of Warsaw, I am totally Polish by background, 100 percent. I was looking in front of my hotel today, at the monument to the victims of Soviet repression and the deportations, it is very powerful. I looked at all the towns that victims came from, and I thought about my grandmother's region – Sambor, She was only from a small village, but you know, it made me think that had she, like so many other Poles, not taken a very difficult decision at that time I probably would not exist, would not be here speaking before you, and the changes that this country has gone through, would have never have happened.

Fundamentally, my talk, is going to end up being optimistic, but it's going to start pessimistic, because the title is, *U.S. relations with NATO's East under Trump: Shaking the foundation*. But before that I just want to build on some other things that were said already and thank all the excellencies who are here, the ambassadors, the other members of the diplomatic and academic communities. Professor Micgiel referred to my new life outside of diplomacy. I have a joint venture with a Finnish company, Lamor Corporation, which is the world's largest oil spill response company. I am on their global board – a fantastic environmental technologies company, and it's really fun to be involved in entrepreneurial endeavor, even if it's scary, because, well, all my meager savings are on the line and I have to succeed. So, it's very nice to be back here and have a chance to think and stretch my mind in the way I did in my previous career, to be here with you in a place that my grandparents may have never been able to enter. So it's a very powerful moment for me, thank you. And also to be an opening speaker, together with Secretary of State Szczerki and with my favorite boss of all time, Ambassador Daniel Fried closing the conference. Dan taught me so much about this part of the world, which I'll get to in a moment, enabled me and my dear friend Kurt Volker, who is now the new special representative for Ukraine, to make it, to move through the State Department system, when there were all sorts of bureaucratic obstacles. If you go back and google us, you will see we were attacked by *The Washington Post*, when we were brought to the State Department from the White House in 2005. There is a position in the State Department called DAS – Deputy Assistant Secretary. That's the

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## WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017 CLOSING SPEECH

AMB. DANIEL FRIED

### ***Defending the Free World***

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One week ago President Trump spoke at Plac Krasińskich and gave the best foreign policy address of his presidency. He spoke of a community of nations, an alliance of countries united by values, among those values the rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of speech. He spoke of a strong alliance of free nations. He spoke a strong Europe. He then mentioned that Russia is acting in Ukraine and other ways, as a destabilizing factor in the world. And therefore reaffirmed America's Article 5 commitment to Poland and to all the other NATO members. As I said, I think this was the best foreign policy speech of President Trump's new presidency. He reaffirmed in essence America's commitment to the free world. The free world is sometimes termed the liberal world order but I really don't like the phrase "the liberal world order," because there are many people who don't describe themselves as liberals, who belong in it, not outside it. I prefer "the free world". And in recommitting the United States to the free world, President Trump was following a centuries-old tradition in the West. In Europe, the notion of a just international order, rooted in transnational values, is at least as old as Erasmus. Emmanuel Kant elaborated the theory of perpetual peace between states committed to the rule of law and republican values. As my country, as America, emerged as a world power at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, we developed our own American Grand Strategy, our version of the free world. We thought of ourselves as distinct from the European empires and spheres of influence of the time. In contrast, America sought an open, rules-based world, more just and simultaneously more profitable for ourselves and for others, because we Americans recognize that our interests, our prosperity and our security are tied to the prosperity and security of other nations. We believe that the advanced democracies of the world should set the global agenda along the lines of this vision. An objective, ambitious, but also generous vision, because we understand America's national interests in broad, not narrow terms. In his memoirs, *Kurier z Warszawy*, Jan Nowak-Jeziorański writes of astonishment at American humanitarian assistance to Poland in 1920 and wondered what sort of nation helped others and asked nothing for itself. But America understood that as we helped others, we in fact advanced our own interests, because America could not do good business with poor countries. We

WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017

## ***Round Table I – Regional Security***

REMARKS BY: GRAEME HERD (GCMC, UNITED KINGDOM)

I am delighted to be in Warsaw on this panel. In 1994 when I graduated with a PhD, and held my first academic post, the first international conference I went to was in Wrocław, and obviously I had to travel through Warsaw. So, it's really nice to be back in Poland and have the opportunity to present in the capital when older and wiser. Today, I am going to try and look at how we understand the rationality, the logic of Russia's foreign policy, particularly the destabilization efforts against neighbours and come to a conclusion as to how sustainable and long-term this approach will be. Will it gradually diminish or is it set to stay as it is or even increase?

To try and understand Russia's foreign policy, we need to look into the domestic economic, political, and social system created by a system-forming figure that is President Vladimir Putin. The two key data points here really are two strategic vulnerabilities that Russia has to deal with. The first is the hydrocarbon dependence, 50% of GDP and 70% of exports, and 98% of corporate tax. The vulnerability is that Russia is dependent on hydrocarbon revenues but cannot affect the price of oil globally (which sets the price of gas). Oil can be priced at \$110pb or at \$25pb and the shift can take place over a matter of months. The second vulnerability is the popularity of the president. When Putin has de-modernized Russia, de-institutionalized and de-globalized Russia it means that if his popularity decreases then you have an existential crisis within the federation. The destabilizing question is: "If not Putin, then whom?" There are no contingency plans, no succession mechanism to replace the leader. So, essentially we are looking at Russia's foreign policy operating in a context where the economy is in the toilet as reflected in a 0.2% average GDP growth since 2009; 2012 – 0% growth and since 2012 when Kudrin resigned from the government. Normally, the popularity of a president – as was the case in the first 8 years of Putin's presidency from 2000 to 2008 – tracks the economy, or maybe lags a little bit behind. As economic performance increases and revenues distributed to the population, so the popularity of the president. So, this is very abnormal politics.

However, within the context of these two strategic vulnerabilities and Russia's inability or unwillingness to address them, destabilization as a mainstay and organizing principle

WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017

## ***Round Table I – Regional Security***

REMARKS BY: MATTHEW RHODES (GCMC, UNITED STATES)

I will try to talk about a little bit about what NATO in particular as a core part of this community has been doing to respond. A starting point is to recognize that this conference is taking place at almost exactly the one year anniversary of NATO's summit here in Warsaw. I had an opportunity to participate during this summit at the parallel Warsaw Summit Experts Forum that was organized by NATO together with the Polish Institute of International Affairs here in Warsaw. While the adults were meeting in the Warsaw National Stadium about 300 other professors and experts such as myself were meeting in a circus tent across the parking lot. Sometimes this felt a little bit silly but it was very interesting to hear firsthand from many of the people attending the main summit and one of the opening speakers there was President Duda. One thing that stuck with me was his remark that for him this summit was the second most important thing that had happened for Poland since the end of the Cold War and the only thing that topped it was Poland's entry to NATO itself, so for him this was really a big deal. What I will try to do in my time is to talk a little bit about why the Warsaw Summit was so important for President Duda and other leaders of the alliance, and try to reflect on where we are a year after that summit and what remains to be done for NATO to respond to the Russian threat especially of hybrid warfare.

For the Warsaw Summit itself the headline outcome is something that may have been familiar to many of you in this room – this initiative known as "Enhanced Forward Presence". This was the initiative to finally have on a rotational basis four NATO battalion-sized battle groups stationed here in Poland under U.S. leadership, in Lithuania under Germany, in Latvia under Canada and in Estonia under British leadership. An additional 12 NATO countries are contributing to the forces in those various countries this year or next. These are now all in place. Having this presence on the ground was as an important reassurance for the countries involved, but also goes beyond a simple symbolic reassurance to a more robust defense and deterrence of Russian hybrid and conventional style warfare. It complemented a range of other military initiatives both at Warsaw and previously, decisions to increase the number of NATO-led exercises in the region, the establishment of multinational brigade headquarters here in Poland and Romania, and an American bilateral



Hybrid war, Information War and Regional  
Conflicts in Post-Soviet Space



KAKHABER KALICHAVA<sup>1</sup>

IVANE JAVAKHISHVILI TBILISI STATE UNIVERSITY, GEORGIA

***Between Kosovan and Georgian Breakaway  
Regions' Conflicts.  
Historical Analysis of the Differential Aspects  
of These Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Period***

**Abstract:** *The end of the Soviet era gave birth to various conflicts throughout the world. Each of these conflicts has its own peculiarities, but also shares certain similarities. The interpretation of each conflict in the post-Soviet space – as well as throughout the history of mankind – has always been dependent on the particular political viewpoints and vectors of various belligerent, or non-belligerent, parties. The case of Kosovo and that of the Georgian breakaway regions, also have their similarities and differences, also rooted in the political interests of each belligerent party. These conflicts, as well as most post-Soviet era conflicts, are characterised by third party involvement derived from the Cold War period, when the world was divided into the two political camps of East and West.*

**Key words:** *Kosovo, Georgia.*

## Introduction

On February 17, 2008, the independence of Kosovo was recognized by the UN, however without the approval of the Security Council. This fact came as an apple of discord between Russia and the West. Russia, the historical *defender* of the Balkan Christendom (highlight by the author) perceived Kosovan independence as a factor undermining Russian influence on the Balkans, assuming that igniting the Georgian conflict regions could have been the appropriate answer for Kosovo to the west. As American diplomat and political analyst Ronald Deitrich Asmus mentioned in his book, only four days after

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VALERIY KRAVCHENKO<sup>1</sup>

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## ***Change of the Security Environment in the Transatlantic Region and its Impact on the Evolution of Foreign and Security Policy of the State***

**Abstract:** *The analysis report includes research of the main trends and their components of relevant change in the European security environment; considers political steps of the main international actors within the sphere of the security architecture of the region. The author describes the possibilities of enhancing a regional cooperation, an implementation of multilateral initiatives in the context of modern security challenges. The report reviews the effect of these changes on the defense policy of Ukraine, suggests and substantiates appropriate recommendations for Ukrainian public authorities on the need for more active involvement in the formation of the new sub-regional security system.*

### **Introduction**

The modern trends in the Euro-Atlantic security environment are dangerous both for the West and Ukraine. Understanding the gravity of the "Russian threat" was the result of consistent anti-Western aggressive rhetoric by Moscow, the demonstration of military campaigns in Ukraine and especially in Syria, all of which contributed to the development of a new policy of physical restraint of Russian expansionary aspirations by Western countries. NATO received a new impetus for existence, unprecedentedly increasing its eastern flank. However, Europe is actually far from unified on its political positions in the face of new threats, demonstrating the destructive tendencies connected with the dominance of populism and euroscepticism, which are typical for most states in the region. In this case special attention should be paid to the position of Eastern European countries, which are the closest neighbors of Ukraine and are considered traditionally as lobbyists

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YEVHEN KUTSENKO<sup>1</sup>

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## ***Hybrid War Activities of Russian Intelligence Services Abroad: The Case of Ukraine***

**Abstract:** *The term 'hybrid warfare,' which is widely understood as mix of conventional/unconventional, regular/irregular, as well as information and cyber warfare, appeared at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently used to describe the strategy used by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War. Since then, the term "hybrid" has dominated much of the discussion about modern and future warfare, to the point where it has been adopted by senior military leaders and promoted as a basis for modern military strategies. But after Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 the term has gone beyond the discussion in small circles of experts and became a starting point for the formation of the new hybrid world order. And its main political agenda is Russian's attempt to bring under control as much independent countries as possible. Since Ukraine became the first (and we sincerely hope the last) hybrid victim in Europe, it is useful to analyze some hybrid war's tactics, that have been used against Ukraine by Russia to predict their usage in other countries, especially in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe region, where the Russian Intelligence services are especially active.*

**Key words:** *hybrid war, Intelligence Services, Ukraine, Russia.*

The activities of Russian intelligence and special security forces against Ukraine clearly reflect the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation. According to the idea and plan of the hybrid war, the political objectives are achieved with minimal armed interaction with the enemy, by means of disruption of the latter's military and economic potential, information and psychological pressure, active support of internal opposition, guerilla warfare and sabotage methods<sup>2</sup>. The special forces of the Russian Federation were entrusted with

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<sup>2</sup> Gerasimov, 2016.

YEVHEN MAHDA<sup>1</sup>

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## ***Hybrid Aggression: A Multi-Pronged Attack***

**Abstract:** *The author tries to show and explain some key features of Russia's hybrid aggression in Europe as a multi-pronged attack. Among them are military challenges, refugee challenges, cultural, informational, gender challenges, the impact on the inner policy of European countries. The author also shows possible ways to answer these challenges and counter the aggression.*

**Key words:** *hybrid aggression, Europe, Russian aggression, sanctions*

In recent times it seems more likely to use the term 'hybrid aggression' instead of 'hybrid war' when referring to events in the Ukrainian East and in Crimea since 2014. This is not only because 'war' sounds more threatening. The term 'aggression' suits the situation better in as far as the term 'hybrid' means a combination of very different instruments, and conventional war is only one of them, and not the main one. Hybrid aggression means a wide range of very different and unexpected challenges. Among them are cyberattacks, informational warfare, a war of images and influence on the emotions.

It is obvious, that goals and instruments are changing, and have already changed, since this hybrid aggression in Europe started. Well, it is also a question as to when it has started. Russia's goals in Europe during 2016–2017 were as follows:

- Dilution of sanctions – gas was not on the sanctions list, but even so the Russian economy is hardly able to withstand the sanctions' pressure for long;

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TEIMURAZ PAPASKIRI<sup>1</sup>

IVANE JAVAKHISHVILI TBILISI STATE UNIVERSITY, GEORGIA

## ***Fake History as a Tool of Russian Propaganda***

**Abstract:** *The paper covers three aspects of Russian Fake History which became a strong tool of the Russian propaganda: 1. The history of the Second World War; 2. The history of the Georgian historical provinces of Abkhazia and Samachablo (so-called South Ossetia); 3. The history of Ukraine.*

**Key words:** *Russian propaganda, World War II, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia.*

The falsification of history has very long roots. The first attempts can be traced back to ancient times, when the first inscriptions appeared. At that time it was just hyperbolization of the deeds of the kings, who were considered as gods. Throughout time the methods have become more refined, the aims more complex and the outcomes more significant. The falsification of history became a trademark of the Soviet Union, where some of the sources were edited to satisfy the desires of its leaders. After the break-up of the Soviet Union the situation in Russia changed, but as can be seen today, it was just a temporary event. During Putin's years, Russia has started fighting against this falsification of history in her own original way by promoting its own version of history, sometimes distorted to such limits that it simply ceased being history at all. Following the present-day trend, it can be called "Fake History." One of the best examples of it is in the article by Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the second issue of the 2016 journal *"Russia in Global Affairs"*.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Sergey Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective, *Russia in Global Affairs*, №2, April-June 2016, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Historical-Perspective-18067>. (The Russian version – Сергей Лавров, Историческая перспектива внешней политики России, *Россия в глобальной политике*, №2, март-апрель 2016 – is available at <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Istoricheskaya-perspektiva-vneshnei-politiki-Rossii-18019>.)

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WAR STUDIES UNIVERSITY, WARSAW, POLAND

## ***Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: tools, channels, narratives***

**Abstract:** *The aim of this paper is to present the Kremlin's propaganda and disinformation mechanism based on a case study of Georgia. The importance of information security has been present in Russian strategic documents since the very beginning of the Russian Federation, however the role of information as a weapon, not as a goal, was developed and publicly voiced much later. Although geopolitical goals in Georgia have remained the same, the switch to non-military means changed the targets, objectives and tools used to achieve them. This paper, following the research and media monitoring conducted between September 2016 and September 2017, analyses Kremlin channels, tools and narratives in the Georgian information sphere and evaluates its effectiveness.*

### **Introduction**

Georgia is an object of special interest for the Russian Federation for several reasons, mainly due to its strategic location. First of all, Georgia connects oil-rich Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea with Turkey and the Black Sea. The route through Georgia is also the shortest way from Russia to Armenia, which would shorten and ease the transport of military equipment to the Middle East. Further, the trade route through Georgia is one of the few routes connecting China with European markets simultaneously omitting Russia. Finally, Georgia is situated in the area called Russia's "soft underbelly", territory considered by Moscow as its natural sphere of influence, hence NATO's or the European Union's presence there is unwelcome. Yet Georgia is important to Russia for one more reason. Although the August war in 2008 was in general won by the Russian Federation, to Moscow's surprise

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# **IV**

## Foreign Policy and Geopolitics



MARIJUŠ ANTONOVIČ<sup>1</sup>

VILNIUS UNIVERSITY, LITHUANIA

## ***Studies in Poland's Foreign Policy: the case of Poland-Russia Relations<sup>2</sup>***

**Abstract:** *This article will analyse the academic literature on Poland's Foreign Policy by focusing on its used theoretical approaches. It will be done through the analysis of the example of Poland's relations with Russia, which it is believed depicts the broader tendencies in the academic literature on Poland's Foreign Policy. Three approaches will be identified – lack of a clear theoretical or methodological perspective, historical perspectives and constructivism. The paper concludes that overall Poland's relations with Russia are understudied, and this opens up opportunities to conduct new research on Poland's foreign policy and to bring new findings on the factors driving it.*

**Key words:** *international relations,*

### **Introduction**

Central Eastern Europe (CEE) has recently received considerable attention in the global media, for numerous reasons. On the one hand, countries in CEE face considerable security challenges: Russia's military actions against Ukraine and provocations in the Baltic and Black sea regions, an assertive Turkey, migration crisis, the deteriorating security situation in Moldova and the Caucasus. On the other hand, various developments within CEE countries have attracted the world's attention to the region: Hungary's authoritarian and defiant stance towards Western governments, a pro-Kremlin president in the Czech Republic, corruption scandals in Slovakia, Romania and Lithuania, the rise of populism, and more frequent anti-Western political forces in CEE countries.

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<sup>2</sup> This article is based on a paper presented at the Warsaw East European Conference 2017, Warsaw University, 2017 July 10-13. The author would like to thank Anna Wojciuk and Tomas Janeliūnas for their useful comments while preparing this article

BARBARA CURYŁO<sup>1</sup>

OPOLE UNIVERSITY, POLAND

## ***EU Public Diplomacy and the Eastern Partnership: Some Reflections on Goals, Determinants and Constraints***

**Abstract:** *The aim of this article is to show public diplomacy using the example of the European Union, which by its very nature is perceived as an actor with a natural potential to conduct public diplomacy. In a more detailed perspective, the analysis concerns EU public diplomacy towards the states of the Eastern Partnership, which is both an addressee of its objectives and a catalyst for its difficulties and constraints. The article consists of three parts. In the first part, the definitions' section of public diplomacy was briefly presented. In the second part, the aims and objectives of public diplomacy in the understanding of the European Union were presented. An important element of this section concerns the justification for why the European Union is perceived as an actor predestined to conduct public diplomacy. In the third part, the starting point for the analysis was the assumption that the EU's goal in public diplomacy is to define its image and its role in its international environment, which is conducive to the EU taking on many international efforts, including the establishment of the Eastern Partnership. At the same time, analysing EU public diplomacy through the prism of this initiative offers a research opportunity to look closely at the limitations of EU public diplomacy in general, which can be strategic in terms of assessing the EU's efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its objectives in international relations.*

**Key words:** *European Union, public diplomacy, Eastern Partnership, goals, determinants, constraints.*

### **Introduction**

Jan Melissen claims that "the European Union has become a true laboratory for public diplomacy experimentation, constantly pressing the boundaries of what is acceptable

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AYDAN ER<sup>1</sup>

UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA, FORLI, TURKEY

## ***The Impact of the Iranian Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) on the Geopolitics of the South Caucasus***

**Abstract:** *This paper examines the evolution of Iran's foreign policy towards the three South Caucasian republics since the agreement of the Iran Nuclear Deal on 14 July 2015 between Iran, P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Union (EU) until today. This paper presents a number of key issues – energy, transportation and trade – related to Iran's policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Furthermore, it provides consideration of the effects of other international actors such as Russia, Turkey and Israel. The aim of this study is to show the complexity of bilateral relations between the states surrounding the South Caucasus and the impact of their multiple overlapping interests on the whole area.*

**Key words:** *Geopolitics, Iran's foreign policy, Iranian Nuclear Deal*

### **Introduction**

The nuclear program of Iran is considered to be one of the most important security issues in the Middle East region over the past three decades. The regional and global actors in the Middle East and South-West Asia were tired of the ongoing Iranian impasse with no single regional country able to dominate the entire region. As a result of twelve years of intense negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, the international community welcomed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which was reached in Vienna between Iran, P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Union (EU). On 16 January 2016, the international sanctions

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EVMORFIA-CHRYSOVALANTOU SEITI<sup>1</sup>

UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW, POLAND

## ***EU foreign policy towards the Black Sea region – similarities and differences with the EU policies towards mediterranean***

**Abstract:** *The European Union (EU) has been expanded and right now consists of 28 member states. The EU is widely considered as a “tour de force” on the path of the European Integration and as a cornerstone of European stability and prosperity.<sup>2</sup> However, the EU is currently facing a range of political and economic pressures. Those pressures make its ability to deal with a multitude of internal and external challenges harder. In the dawn of the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) in order those challenges and many others to be tackled an effective cooperation between EU member states is needed and as it illustrated in the EUGS’s document it is more than crucial that the EU ensure that there are good relations with its neighbors. In this article, I am going to analyze the EU Foreign Policy towards the Mediterranean and Black Sea Region after the end of the Cold War. Last but not least I will examine if those policies are considered successful or not and what their differences and similarities are.*

**Key words:** *EU Foreign Policy, Black Sea Region, Mediterranean Region, Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean, EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*

### **Introduction**

The starting point of the development of the EU Foreign and Security Policy can be considered the Maastricht Treaty, which established a Common Foreign and Security Policy that constituted the second pillar of the new three-pillared European Union. The aim of the CFSP was to protect the common values, the fundamental interests and the independ-

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<sup>2</sup> Kristin Archik, “*The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects*”, Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2017, available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44249.pdf>.

KONRAD ZASZTOWT<sup>1</sup>

UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW, POLAND

## ***Turkey and East Central Europe: idealism, pragmatism, misperception or clash of interests?***

**Abstract:** *Turkey is focused on Russia in its policy vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, Caucasus, Ukraine, Balkan countries as well as, at least to some extent, Central European countries, including Poland. This priority has its impact on Ankara's relationship with Eastern and Central European countries, which remain in the shadow of Turkish policy towards Russia. However that negative impact is not powerful enough to spoil Turkey's cooperation with Eastern and Central European countries. It certainly limits the scope of such partnerships or alliances. Turkey continues to cooperate with the region's countries, but often rejects their Euro-Atlanticism. In Turkish perception the EU's enlargement in Central Europe was unjust (as Turkey has been applying much longer for the EU's membership without any significant progress, whereas post-communist countries were accepted relatively quickly). NATO enlargement in the East in Turkey's view was always a 'risky adventure'. At the same time, from Ankara's point of view the Middle East is strategically more important than Turkish northern neighbourhood. Moreover, Turkey wants to be an equal interlocutor in dialogue with Russia, the U.S. and the EU, whereas it often conceives post-communist and post-Soviet countries merely as a zone of influence for the Kremlin and Washington or their battleground in Cold War 2.0.*

**Key words:** *East-Central Europe, Turkey, Poland, Visegrad region, Black Sea region, Middle East, United States, NATO, Russia, Cold War, threat assessment, stereotype, Eurasianism, Euro-Atlanticism,*

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**V**

## Public Sphere in the Post-Soviet Space



JAN HOLZER<sup>1</sup>, PETR MARTÍNEK<sup>2</sup>

MASARYK UNIVERSITY, BRNO, CZECH REPUBLIC

## ***Modern authoritarian regimes: a contribution to the systematisation of the continuing debate***

**Abstract:** *This paper deals with the conceptual framework of so-called 'modern authoritarianism', allegedly a form of government typical of non-democratic regimes at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The paper is based on the approach of Tyler Roylance, who divided the sources of legitimacy employed by modern authoritarian regimes into five spheres: the economy, the media, political competition, civil society and the rule of law. Following the arguments presented by various authors in their efforts to conceptualise different examples of modern authoritarianism, the paper aims to contrast this debate with the classical approaches to the research of non-democratic regimes.*

**Key words:** *Non-democracies, authoritarian regimes, modern authoritarian regimes, propaganda, corruption.*

### **Introduction to the debate about modern authoritarianism**

In recent years there has been a noticeable shift in comparative political science, away from efforts to define what has been called 'hybrid regimes', which are conceived as being located somewhere on the boundary between democracies and non-democracies,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Works in Czech on hybrid regimes include Holzer and Balík (2006), Drahokoupil (2014) and Bílek (2015).

ULIANA MOVCHAN<sup>1</sup>

V.N. KARAZIN KHARKIV NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, UKRAINE

## ***Power-Sharing as a Peace-Building Solution for Ukraine***

**Abstract:** *The institutional arrangement in Ukraine is a game with zero-sum: a strong president (winner) takes all. In the case of the ongoing conflict in the East of Ukraine and the consequences of such a conflict, it forces us to look for a solution to overcome the existing problem, especially, where each part of Ukraine can feel its impact on the political process (or decision-making). When comparing the power-sharing situation in Ukraine (like a president from one political party, and a prime minister from the opposite, or from another patron-client network, or a coalition consisting of opposite parties) it has been found that democracy is much more likely to occur in these situations, and Ukraine which is in the process of democratic transformation can come closer to other European countries. Therefore these findings open the door to thinking about not just how to reform the existing majoritarian model of democracy, which produces a winner-takes-all outcome, but to look for a model which would share something between each substantial segment of society, and would give a better chance for Ukraine to be a democratic country and a real part of the European community. Such a model could become the power-sharing model suggested by Arend Lijphart, which presupposes systems with interest accommodation and power sharing among significant segments of society.<sup>1</sup>*

### **Introduction**

On the way to establishing democratic institutions, scholars and politicians are faced with difficulties in their effective functioning. Unsuccessful attempts to introduce democratic institutions in the twentieth century have shown us that most of the political systems

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SHAHLA KAZIMOVA<sup>1</sup>

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## *The emancipation policy during the Soviet period in Azerbaijan*

**Abstract:** *The work focuses on the political history of the emancipation of women in Soviet Azerbaijan during the 1920s and 1930s. The author's intention is to describe the forms and methods utilised by the communist regime to enforce the engagement of women in the socio-political, and economic life of the country.*

At the turn of the 19th and 20th century the issue of a women's role in society became one of the crucial components of ideology of the modernization and democratization of Azerbaijani society. Many Azerbaijani intellectuals stood at the forefront of those ideas engaging directly in educational and charitable activities towards women. This was an important stage in the process of raising awareness of analphabetism, early marriage and abuse of women's civil rights.

These efforts resulted in the enfranchisement of women and enfranchizing them with voting rights in 1918 during the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic period. However, taking into account the level of conservatism among the Muslim society, in which women's rights were highly limited, the newly introduced law brought little – if any – breakthrough. The real cultural revolution came along after 1920, during the Soviet era.

The Azerbaijani intelligentsia tried to solve women issues with a gradual, step-by-step approach. The co-founder of the first Azerbaijani republic Mehemmed Emin Resulzade considered women's issues as a statesman. In 1913 he wrote: "Nations are formed by families. Nations which are formed by faulty families, are themselves faulty."<sup>2</sup> He argued that societies formed by unequal marriages could not compete with nations which are created by partnership marriages where both the husband and wife have equal rights<sup>3</sup>. Resulzade

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<sup>2</sup> Shirmammad Huseynov, ed. *Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə. Əsərləri, II cild, 1909-1914*. (Baku: Shirvannashr, 2001), 207.

<sup>3</sup> Huseynov, *Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə. Əsərləri*, 247.

OLGA MAKSYMOWYCH<sup>1</sup>

VASYL STEFANYK PRECARPATHIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, UKRAINE

## ***Value Orientations and Social Status Aspirations of Frontier Teenagers in Eastern and Central Europe***

**Abstract:** *This research deals with a comparative sociological analysis of values and social-status aspirations of adolescents who live at the border areas in Central and Eastern Europe in Ukraine, Poland and Hungary. The key issues of the article are based on a comparative survey of teenage youth of Ivano-Frankivsk's graduates (n=774) on the one hand and Ukrainian citizens on the other hand. Additionally, a comparative study of social-status aspirations of adolescents from Ukraine – Kharkiv (n=428), Drohobych (n=392), Poland (Zielona Gora (n=336); Rzeszow (n=294)) and Hungary (Nyiregyhaza (n=359)) -- based on the international study «Youth on the border of Central and Eastern Europe» is analysed. The paper investigates the trend of European-oriented identity of teenagers' values. It shows that there are more common characteristics of value orientations than differences among Ukrainian, Polish and Hungarian teenagers. It concludes that it is conditioned by the characteristics of their youthful age, including modern educational influence on their consciousness and communicational experience determined by the fact of living at "the borderland of cultures and peoples". The prospects for further study of the subject are also discussed.<sup>1</sup>*

**Key words:** *borderland, value orientations, adolescents, frontier, Eastern and Central Europe,*

## **Introduction**

It is well-established that the process of Eastern and Central Europe frontier scientific investigation began at the end of the 20th century as a result of fundamental transformations in the geopolitical structure of the region, as determined by the destruction of the former USSR. Both the process of European integration and the collapse of the former USSR resulted in the creation of new independent states, as well as the formation of

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